ABORTION AND THE VIABILITY STANDARD-TOWARD A
MORE REASONED DETERMINATION OF THE STATE'S
COUNTERVAILING INTEREST IN PROTECTING
PRENATAL LIFE
In Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme Court invalidated
a Texas criminal statute proscribing all abortions except where
the procedure is necessary to protect the mother's life. 2 The
Court's holding in Roe, together with its ruling in the companion
case of Doe v. Bolton,' delivered the same day, invalidated the
criminal abortion laws of a majority of states.4
The Roe Court held that the right to privacy, a derivative of
the fourteenth amendment's concept of liberty recognized in
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 protects a pregnant woman's decision regarding the termination of her pregnancy. 6 Regulations which
impede the exercise of a fundamental right such as abortion, in
order to be sustained, must advance a compelling state interest in
7
the least restrictive manner necessary to advance that interest.
The Court identified two legitimate interests in pursuit of which a
state might regulate abortion: (1) the protection of maternal
health, and (2) the protection of the potentiality of human life.8
These interests increase in importance during pregnancy and ultimately become compelling.9 Prior to the conclusion of the first
trimester, neither interest is considered compelling and therefore, the State may not regulate abortion in a manner which impedes a woman's ability to obtain an abortion.' Subsequent to
the first trimester, however, the state's interest in protecting maternal health is considered compelling." At this point, a state
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 117-18, 170.

2

3 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Doe v. Bolton involved a Georgia criminal abortion
statute modeled after section 230.3 of the Model Penal Code. Id. at 182 (citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (1962)). The statute proscribed abortions except
where the pregnancy endangered the mother's life or health, the fetus would likely
be born severely handicapped, or where the pregnancy was the result of a rape. Id.
at 183 (citation omitted).
4 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 & n.2; see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 182 n.3.
5 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
7 Id. at 155.
8 Id. at 162.
9 Id. at 162-63.
10 Id. at 163.
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may regulate abortion in a manner which advances this interest.' 2
After the second trimester, the state's interest in protecting the
potential for human life becomes compelling and a state then
may regulate and even proscribe abortions except where the procedure is necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant
woman. 13

Under the Roe Court's analysis, the question of whether the
United States Constitution guarantees a right to abortion involves a bipartite inquiry: (1) whether state regulation of abortion infringes upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
and (assuming the first question is answered in the affirmative)
(2) whether, and under what circumstances, the state's countervailing interest in protecting prenatal life is sufficient to override
that liberty interest.' 4 These questions are distinct. 15 An examination of abortion decisions delivered by the United States
Supreme Court subsequent to Roe, however, indicates that these
concepts have not remained distinct. 16 Two common errors
reoccur: (1) upon resolution of one question, failing to recognize
the existence of the other,' 7 and (2) allowing its opinion with re12

Id.

13

Id. at 163-64.

14 See id., at 154-55 (holding that the liberty to obtain an abortion is a constitu-

tionally protected fundamental right, while at the same time acknowledging that
states can place limits on fundamental rights if they advance a compelling state
interest); see also L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTEs 96 (1990) ("The
Supreme Court has [a] . . .long tradition of asking first about the [constitutional]
right that is asserted, to see whether it is a fundamental liberty, and only then turning to the reasons, such as protection of the fetus's right to life, that might nonetheless justify that liberty's abridgement.") (emphasis in original).
15 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 796 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Consistent with the Supreme Court's
analysis in other substantive due process cases, the Roe Court overtly avoided any
type of balancing equation. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf."A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923 n.28 (1973). With respect to any countervailing interest advanced by the state, a finding that such an interest is compelling is both necessary and sufficient to sustain a regulation which impedes the exercise of a
fundamental right. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
634 (1969). This is assuming-and no one has argued to the contrary-that the
regulation is well-crafted to advance that interest. Id.
16 See infra notes 19 & 20.
17 This phenomenon is evidenced by the manner in which various Supreme
Court Justices have framed the issue. Compare Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3072 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The true jurisprudential debate underlying this [abortion] case [is] whether the Constitution includes an 'unenumerated' general right to privacy ... and to what extent such a
right to privacy extends to matters of childbearing and family life, including abortion.") with Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 796 (WhiteJ, dissenting) ("Both the characterization of the abortion liberty as fundamental and the denigration of the State's

1991]

COMMENT

349

gard to one question prejudice its analysis of the other.' 8 In order to focus on the countervailing interests and avoid similar
confusion, it will be presumed in this comment that restrictions
on abortion impede a constitutionally protected liberty interest.' 9
The examination will be confined solely to the second questionwhether the state's interest in protecting prenatal life is of sufficient importance to override abridgement of this liberty.
Part I of this comment will examine the Roe Court's reasoning which supports the conclusion that the state's interest in protecting prenatal life does not become compelling until the fetus is
viable. Part II will attempt to look behind the rationale advanced
by various members of the Court in order to identify the inferences and presumptions which underlie this sentiment. In this
section, it will be argued that the viability standard is a surrogate
for a different standard which links the value of life with cognitive
ability. Part III will examine the Court's continued failure to
ground its jurisprudential framework for adjudicating abortion
interest in preserving the lives of nonviable fetuses are essential [in order to] ...
limit the state's power to regulate abortion."). In Webster, it is evident that Justice
Blackmun's articulation of the constitutional issue regarding abortion reflects little
or no recognition of the state's countervailing interest in protecting prenatal life.
In contrast, Justice White's characterization of this same issue in Thornburgh reflects
a clear delineation of the two distinct questions.
18 Compare Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) ("That the
abortion decision, like the decisions protected in Griswold, Einstadt, and Carey, concerns childbearing (or more generally, family life) in no sense necessitates a holding that the liberty to choose abortion is 'fundamental.' That the decision involves
the destruction of the fetus renders it different in kind from the decision not to
conceive in the first place.") with id. at 776 (Stevens, J, concurring) ("Justice White
abruptly announces that the interest in 'liberty' that is implicated by a decision not
to bear a child that is made a few days after conception is less fundamental than a
comparable decision made before conception. There may, of course, be a significant difference in the strength of the countervailing state interest, but I fail to see
how a decision on childbearing becomes less important the day after conception
than the day before."). Clearly, the existence of the countervailing interest represented by the fetus colors Justice White's characterization of the liberty interest
implicated by abortion regulations. In sharp contrast, Justice Stevens characterization of the nature of this liberty interest is unaffected by the existence of any countervailing interest although he acknowledges that this interest may need to be
subordinated to the state's interest in protecting prenatal life.
19 There is, however, deep division on this question among legal scholars. Compare, e.g., Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudications, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 310-11 (1973) (maintaining that abortion is not
constitutionally protected) and Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The
Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159, 167-72 (1973) (maintaining that the abortion cases cannot be included in the right to privacy) with Heymann & Barzelay, The
Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 773 (1973) (maintaining that abortion regulations impede a constitutionally protected privacy
interest).
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cases into a conceptual model from which the value of prenatal
life can be derived from morally relevant criteria. The comment
will conclude with an argument in support of conducting a reexamination of Roe v. Wade.
PART I

The Nature of the State's CountervailingInterest
It is difficult to articulate precisely why states attempt to preserve prenatal life. One may question why a fetus should be regarded as an object of moral concern worthy of state protection.
Frequently, the terms "life" and "person" are invoked to describe the unborn as if this should somehow clarify the matter.2 °
For instance, the abortion issue is often framed as "when life begins"" or "whether the fetus is a person. ' ' 2 2 Inquiries which utilize the terms "life" and "person" do more to obfuscate than to
illuminate one's understanding of the issues underlying the abor23
tion debate.

The abortion issue tends to focus on the word "life." ' 24 The
question "when does life begin," however, invites only one answer-at conception. 25 The proposition that abortion results in
the destruction of human life is beyond dispute. 26 Pro-choice advocates, who adamantly advance the proposition that science cannot determine the beginning of human life,27 are actually
advancing a conceptually distinct argument that some fetuses do
not possess the intrinsic worth and value which give rise to the
government's general obligation to protect life. 28 Rather than
20 See Macklin, Personhoodand the Abortion Debate, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 81 (1984); Wilder, Concepts of Personhood: A PhilosophicalPerspective, in
DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 14 (1983).
21 Wilder, supra note 20, at 14.
22 Macklin, supra note 20, at 81-82.
23 See infra notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
24 Wilder, supra note 20 at 14.
25 See B. MILBAUER, infra note 40, at 111.
26 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1348-49 (1988)

("Nor can we get anywhere on this issue by debating whether 'fetal life' is 'human
life:' what other form or species of life could it be?"). But see C. YOUNG, THE LEAST
OF THESE 25 (1983) ("Whether the fetus is or is not a human being is a matter of
definition, not fact; and we can define any way we wish.") (quoting Hardin, Abortion--or Compulsoiy Pregnancy?, 30 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 246, 250
(1968)).
27 See S. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-52 (1981).
28 See Horan and Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Justification in Histoy, Law or Logic, in
ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS

75 (1987). This is not to suggest that the injection of normative concepts into the
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redefine the issue from that of life to value, pro-choice advocates
have opted instead to redefine the word "life" by subtly injecting
into the definition normative concepts which suggest value.29
From the point of view of facilitating dialogue, the choice was
unfortunate.
Resolution of the abortion question does not depend on a
determination of whether the fetus is a living organism and a
member of the homo sapien species [hereinafter the scientific
question]. If such resolution did, the question could have been
easily answered by those trained in science and medicine.3 0 The
almost universally accepted fact that life begins at conception is
not necessarily dispositive of whether a fetus is worth protecting
[hereinafter the value question]. Science is of limited value in
resolving this second question."1 These two questions are distinct3 2 and permitting the term "life" to do double-duty obscures
this distinction. The Court's complicity in this enterprise has not
only contributed to the confusion but has needlessly prolonged
the nation's division over this issue.
Roe v. Wade: A Study in Obfuscation
The Roe Court began its analysis by observing that the word
"person", as utilized in the fourteenth amendment, does not include the unborn.33 Essentially, semantics were substituted for
reasoned analysis. The fact that a fetus is not a person under the
definition of "life" is deliberately misleading. A fair argument can be made that a
value-laden definition is the more common usage. As Justice Stevens observed in a
slightly different context, a reader who picked up a book entitled "The Life ofJohn
Marshall" would be surprised to find that it contained only biological data. See
Cruzan v. Director,Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2887 n.20 (1990) (Stevens,J.,
dissenting).
29 See generally, Veatch, Definition of Life and Death: Should There be Consistency?, in
DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 102-03 (1983).
30 See infra note 40.

The Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers concluded that "science
is not relevant to [this] ... question." S. REP. No. 158, supra note 27, at 3. This,
however, overstates the point. Science may or may not be relevant to determining
fetal worth, depending on the criteria one adopts. If the presence of brain waves or
the ability to feel pain are relevant criteria, science clearly can be of assistance in
resolving this question. See, e.g., Callahan, The Role of Science in Moral and Societal
Decision Making: The Human Life Bill as a Case Study, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 320 (1983) (illustrating numerous examples
where moral and policy goals are mixed with scientific evidence to formulate reasonable judgments).
32 S. REP. No. 158, supra note 27, at 3.
33 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (citation omitted).
31

...
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definition embodied in the fourteenth amendment is irrelevant.3 4
The issue before the Roe Court was not the state's constitutional
obligation to protect prenatal life, in which case the fact that a fetus is not a person entitled to fourteenth amendment protection
might have been highly relevant. 35 Rather, the question in Roe
34 See Ely, supra note 15, at 925-26. Professor Ely observed that the word "person" in its various constitutional contexts frequently does not include children or
adolescents. Id. at 925-26. Further, Professor Ely maintained that "it has never
been held or even asserted that the state interest needed to justify forcing a person
to refrain from an activity, whether or not that activity is constitutionally protected, must
implicate either the life or the constitutional rights of another person." Id. at 926
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). For example, the state can protect animals even where animal sacrifice is mandated by a citizen's religion. See, e.g., Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D.Fla.
1989) (upholding against a first amendment challenge,-an anti-animal cruelty ordinance regulating ritual animal sacrifice mandated by the plaintiffs' religion). Moreover, the state can protect private property from defacement by punishing
individuals who place burning crosses on another's front lawn or who paint swastikas on the front doors of private residences. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 278 N.C. 458,
180 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1971) (court held that "[n]o constitutional questions are
raised" on the appeal of a conviction for unlawfully placing a burning cross on
another's property without first obtaining the owner's permission); State v. Fahy,
149 Conn. 577, 183 A.2d 256 (1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (court upheld a conviction for willfully injuring public
property where defendant allegedly painted a swastika on a synagogue). This state
protection exists despite the attending burden placed on the free expression rights
of white supremacists. Presumably, the courts could have reached these conclusions without first determining that animals and private property constitute "persons" possessing constitutional rights.
Professor Tribe, finding this reasoning unpersuasive, argued that the pursuit
of a fundamental right need not entail any of these violations whereas "a woman's
fundamental liberty of reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity necessarily collides with fetal survival prior to viability: that is what the dispute is all about." L.
TRIBE, supra note 26, § 15-10, at 1349 n.79 (emphasis in original).
Professor Tribe has, however, blurred the distinction between whether a statute impedes the exercise of a fundamental right and whether it advances a compelling state interest. The fact that fetal survival and the woman's reproductive
autonomy are unavoidably in conflict does not in any way make the state's interest
in protecting pre-natal life less compelling. Thus, regardless of any other legal
significance fetal personhood may have, the issue of whether the intended beneficiary of the legislation is a "person" or has constitutional rights is irrelevant to
whether the state's interest is compelling.
35 There is language in Roe and subsequent abortion cases suggesting that a
finding that a fetus is a "person" under a fourteenth amendment definition would,
by that fact alone, end legalized abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57
(1973); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3083 & n.13 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Recognition of fetal personhood, however, would not have this effect because the fourteenth amendment applies only to state action. NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND YOUNG,
CONsTrruriONAL LAW 421 (1986). Actions of individuals are not governed by the
fourteenth amendment unless the activity is somehow linked to the actions of the
state. Id. Thus, if private individuals sought to end the lives of fetal persons and the
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was the extent to which states are permitted to protect prenatal
life when this can be done only at the expense of limiting a woman's liberty to obtain an abortion.3 6 The Roe Court ultimately
contradicted itself by forbidding states to proscribe the abortion
of a pre-viable fetus while, oddly enough, allowing states to proscribe an abortion of a viable fetus. 37 The Court disregarded the
fact that both pre-viable and viable fetuses are considered
nonpersons under the fourteenth amendment definition."
Having had some success in obscuring the central issue in
the abortion debate by miring it in semantic distinctions of the
word "person," the Roe Court undertook a similar effort in the
word "life." Justice Blackmun wrote: "We need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary . . .is not in a

position to speculate as to the answer." 9
It is essential to determine in what sense (value or science)
the Roe Court used the term "life." If the term was used in reference to the scientific question then, as previously indicated, the
question of "when does life begin" is not difficult to resolve and
a consensus certainly exists as to the fact that life begins at conception.40 If, as is more likely,4 ' the term "life" was used in referstate had no objection, there would be no due process issue presented by these
facts.
36 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-65; Epstein, supra note 19, at 168.
37 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
38 Id. at 157-58 (the Roe court construed the word "person" in the fourteenth
amendment as having only post-natal application).
39
40

Id. at 159.

Scientists discovered that life begins at conception as early as 1827. B.
111
(1983). Prior to that time, it was widely believed that life began at "quickening,"
the point at which the mother could sense fetal movement. Id. These scientific
findings have enjoyed universal acceptance in the scientific and medical community. See S. REP. No. 158, supra note 27, at 7-10.
This position has been attacked by several biologists who assert that the beginning of life predates conception. Dr. Josuah Lederberg, while testifying before a
Senate subcommittee in opposition to the Human Life Bill, argued that "[tihere is
no single, simple answer [as] to [when life begins] .... In contemporary experience, life in fact never begins-it is a continuum from generation to generation."
Wikler, Concepts of Personhood,supra note 20, at 15 (quoting Lederberg,J., Human Life
Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcommittee on the Judiciaiy, 97th Cong., 1st sess. 48,
50 (1982)). See also Grobstein, A Biological Perspective on the Origin of Human Life and
Personhood, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
320 (1983).
It is not entirely clear where this line of reasoning leads. It is unlikely that its
proponent is arguing that because life begins before conception, the state has a
MILBAUER, THE LAw GIVETH: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
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ence to the value question, the Court correctly stated that no
consensus exists as to the value which should be placed on prenatal life.42 Justice Blackmun erred, however, by concluding that
the Court need not resolve the question of when life begins (the
value question) .4 To the contrary, what intrinsic value is possessed by prenatal life is precisely the question which the Court
must answer in order to determine if a state's interest in protecting that life is compelling. Despite the Roe Court's claim to the
contrary,4 4 it did nothing less than attempt to resolve the question of when life beings when it announced that the state's interest in protecting fetal life does not become compelling until
viability.45
By attaching a nebulous definition to the word "life", the Roe
Court avoided exposing its underlying belief-that some human
lives are of limited value and thus unworthy of state protection.
The Court buried this value judgement beneath the fiction that
fetuses are not human life at all. An acknowledgment that abortion results in the destruction of human life would have forced
the Court to recognize the fact that abortion has disturbing conceptual similarities to infanticide.
In order to separate abortion from infanticide, it was essential that the Court first separate fetuses from infants. The reasons for this are clear. In an abortion, procedures are performed
compelling interest in regulating contraception. Once it is determined that the beginning of life precedes abortion, there is no profit in making finer distinctions.
This argument should be viewed as an indirect attack on the relevancy of the beginning of life.
41 The Roe Court makes no attempt to challenge scientific findings which indicate that life begins at conception. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
These findings have enjoyed universal acceptance for 150 years. See S. REP. No.
158, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
42 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 159.
45 Id. at 163. See Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of ConstitutionalReview from Griswold

v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely OverrulingRoe, 1989
L.J. 1677, 1680-81 (1989). Professor Van Alstyne noted that:
Justice Blackmun [in Roe] ... quite rightly observed [that] . . . it was
not for the Court to substitute its view ... as to how [it] might measure the calculus of fetal life ....
Yet ... despite that clear and well

stated position for the Court, Justice Blackmun ended by doing exactly
that which the Court disclaimed [when he]... declare[d] that no legislative [position on abortion] . . . would be regarded by the Court as
acceptable unless [that position] . . . selected as the earliest date [for

which the fetus was] worthy of general protection from death by abortion

. . .

the twenty-fourth week of [gestation].

Id. at 1680-81 (emphasis in original).

...
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on a fetus which, if performed on an infant, would be unconscionable.4 6 Proscriptions on infanticide, however, like those on
abortion, restrict a woman's ability to escape parenthood and
thus do similar damage to a woman's autonomy.4 7 Nevertheless,
the state's authority to protect postnatal life has never been seriously questioned.4" This is true regardless of whether the child is
conceived as a result of rape or incest, is severely deformed, has a
genetic disease, or the parents are poor or have other children.4 9
Thus, in order to maintain that the state's interest in protecting
the fetus is not compelling, a mechanism was employed which
removed the fetus from the group of living human beings almost
universally recognized as proper objects of moral concern and
state protection. The Court engaged in a variety of rhetorical
mechanisms which allowed it to avoid acknowledging the disturbing similarities between infanticide and abortion. 50 The result, according to one commentator, has been:
[a] curious avoidance of the scientific fact, which everyone really knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra- or extra-uterine until death. The very
considerable semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything but taking a human life would
be ludicrous if they were not put forth under socially impeccable auspices. 5 '
The Court could have inquired as to whether and at what point
the factors which compel legal restraints on infanticide are present
in gestation. This, however, would have involved a discussion of
when life begins (or as defined here-when value attaches). But because theologians, doctors and philosophers failed to reach any conEpstein, supra note 19, at 176.
It will not suffice to argue that the option of placing a child into the adoption
process will protect the woman's autonomy interest. This conclusion would "ignore[] the emotional pressures that make it difficult to abandon one's offspring as
well as the legal constraints society imposes upon such a choice." See L. TRIBE,
supra note 26, § 15-16, at 1340 n.21 (1988). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 104.
("Pregnancy is not.., a minor and temporary imposition whose burdens are limited by the availability of adoption.... Pregnancy does not merely inconvenience a
woman for a time; it gradually turns her into a mother and makes her one for all
time.).
48 Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 678
(1988).
49 Epstein, supra note 19, at 177-78.
50 See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 27-28 (1973); Ely, Crying Wolf, supra
note 15, at 927.
5' C. YOUNG, supra note 26, at 25 (quoting A New Ethicfor Medicine and Society, 113
CALIFORNIA MEDICINE 67, 68 (1970)).
46
47
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sensus concerning this inquiry, the Court was disinclined to follow
their lead. 52 Any fair analysis of the state's interest in protecting
prenatal life, however, must begin with an acknowledgment that fetuses are human beings and abortion results in their destruction. By
continually disputing this point-a dispute which cannot be resolved because it is illusory-the debate is deflected away from the
real issue regarding abortion on which there is legitimate room for
dispute-how strong is the state's interest in protecting prenatal
life? 53
Denigration of the Fetus
The method by which the Supreme Court in Roe evaded this
essential question deserves some examination. In Roe, Justice
Blackmun concluded, after a lengthy historical exegesis, that "restrictive criminal abortion laws [were] of relatively recent vintage."' 54 He noted that "at common law, at the time of the
adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion
of the 19th Century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than
under most American statutes currently in effect."' 5 5 The Court
acknowledged that the state's interest in protecting prenatal life
was among the reasons commonly advanced to explain the
criminalization of abortion during the late 19th Century, as well
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
This is not meant to suggest that the adverse effects which may befall a woman who is prevented from aborting an unwanted pregnancy are irrelevant. To the
contrary, these adverse effects constitute an essential premise to the pro-choice position and in large part are undisputed. See Wertheimer, Philosophy on Humanity,
ABORTION: PRO AND CON 108-09 (1974) (rejecting the pro-abortionists' claim that
the abortion dispute reflects a differing emphasis on bodily integrity and welfare,
and concluding that the disagreement actually involves differing perceptions as to
fetal humanity). To the extent that there is any dispute on this matter, resolution
would affect only the issue of whether abortion regulations implicate a constitutionally protected privacy interest and not whether the state's countervailing interest is
compelling.
54 Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
55 Id. at 140. The Roe Court devotes approximately one-half of its opinion to an
historical survey of criminal abortion laws. See id. at 129-52. The Court never
clearly indicates the legal significance of this historical review. See id. In several
substantive due process cases the Court based the recognition of a fundamental
right on whether the liberty in question had been enjoyed throughout Anglo-American law. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968). The historical analysis presented by the Roe
Court, however, reveals little more than the fact that different cultures, at different
times, had different ideas as to the value of prenatal life, the point at which life
begins, and the moral turpitude to be attached to abortion. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 12962. See also Epstein, supra note 19, at 167. Why this should be viewed as an historical mandate has not been explained. See Ely, supra note 15, at 925 n.42.
52
53

1991]

COMMENT

357

as justification for its continued existence.56 The Court stated
that this view rests on the theory that a new human life is present
Justice Blackmun conceded
from the moment of conception.
that one need not embrace the view that "life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth" in order to recognize the state's interest in protecting prenatal life. 5 8 One can
hold to a "less rigid" view that the state has an interest in protecting "potential life." 59 At some point, this legitimate interest
becomes sufficiently compelling so as to permit states to regulate
abortion notwithstanding the privacy right 6° - that point occurs at
viability. 6 '
In what appears to be a reasonable concession, the Court
acknowledged that a finding that life begins at conception or
sometime thereafter is not essential for a determination that a
state has an interest in protecting prenatal life, because the fetus
clearly has the potential for life. 62 The Court then proceeded to
evaluate the efficacy of that interest under the assumption that
the fetus is potential life rather than life. 63 By the time the reader
reaches the final conclusion, he has forgotten that the line of reasoning is predicated upon that assumption that a fetus is only
potential life, and not life in the value sense.6 4 After concluding
that the state's interest in protecting potential life is insufficient
to uphold the statute, the Court should have proceeded to evaluate whether the fetus was life (in the value sense) and whether
that would affect the sufficiency of the state's interest in its protection. By failing to do so, the Court begged the essential
question.
The Court in Roe, by attaching to the fetus the dehumanizing
56 Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. Other explanations posited by the Court were (1) the
desire to discourage illicit sexual activity, and (2) the protection of pregnant women
from the hazards of primitive abortion procedures. Id. at 148-150.
57 Id. at 150.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 162-63.
61 Id. at 163. Viability is the point at which the fetus has a reasonable chance of
survival outside the womb. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 63 (1976). It is generally acknowledged that this point occurs as early as the
twenty-fourth week of gestation. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160; Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (citation omitted). At the point of viability, however, the infant can survive only if provided with extensive artificial life support. Colautti, 439
U.S. at 387.
62 Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
63 Id. at 150-64.
64 See id.
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label of "potential life", subtly leads the reader into believing
that abortion does not result in the destruction of human life.
The inescapable but unstated inference is that the state's interest
in regulating abortion is similar to its interest in regulating contraception and dissimilar to its interest in regulating infanticide.
By utilizing this reason-by-labeling technique, the Court further
effected this conceptual separation of fetuses and infants without
subjecting the logic behind such a classification scheme to any
real scrutiny. Perhaps more disturbing is the fact that the original dissenting Justices in Roe, as well as those justices who joined
the Court subsequent to Roe (and who dissented from the
Court's opinions invalidating abortion regulations), have
adopted the potential life label in reference to prenatal life. 65
It has been noted that the inhibitions against killing ones
own kind "are generally so strong that the victims must first be
deprived of their human status if systematic killing is to proceed .. ."66 Dehumanizing metaphors are frequently employed

in reference to certain population groups to further this end: 6 7
"[once] dehumanized, principles of morality no longer apply to
them and moral restraints against killing are more readily overcome."68 The term "potential life" has had precisely this effect.
The widespread use of the term potential life has given Roe ad65 See Webster v: Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989).
In a plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices
White and Kennedy, the Court stated, "[W]e do not see why the State's interest in
potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability .... );
see also id. at 3062 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("No decision of this Court has held
that the State may not directly promote its interest in potential life .... ); id. at
3084 (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("No one argues... that Missouri can assert a societal
interest in increasing its population as its secular reason for fostering potential
life."); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I ...remain of the view[] ...that
[t]he [s]tate has compelling interests in ... protecting potential human life ....);
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the State's interest in protecting potential human life exists throughout the pregnancy.") (cited with approval in Webster,
109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Hams v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 328
(1980) (White, J., concurring) ("At an appropriate stage in a pregnancy ... abortion could be prohibited to implement the governmental interest in potential
life."); but see Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 794 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State's
countervailing interest in protecting fetal life-or as the Court would have it, 'potential life,'-becomes compelling at the point which the fetus is viable.").
66 See L. KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 87
(1981).
67 Id. at 84-88.
68 Id. at 87.
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herents a decided rhetorical advantage and should not have occurred without protest.
The Magic Moment of Viability: An Illogical Criterion
The Roe Court concluded that the point at which a state's
interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling is viability. 69 Interestingly, the Roe Court did not hold that a viable fetus
is no longer merely potential life as opposed to actual life, a distinction which would have permitted the fetus to receive state
protection. Rather, the Court appears to hold the view that even
a viable fetus is still only potential life.70 For reasons which are
not entirely clear, however, a state's interest in protecting viable
in contrast with nonviable potential life, is
potential life,
71
compelling.
The seemingly contradictory concept of "viable potential
life' 72 has been used in reference to prenatal life not only by the
Justices who comprised the Roe majority but also by those Justices who generally vote to uphold statutes restricting abortion.73
It is difficult to understand why viability should be relevant to,
much less control, the measure of a state's interest in protecting
prenatal life. The only reason that the state's interest in protect69 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
70 Id. at 164-65. ("[Slubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life
may ... proscribe abortion .. ")(emphasis added).
71 The Court's rationale for this distinction is simply inadequate. See Roe, 410
U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."). This,
however, is nothing more than a mere restatement of the definition of viability and
should not be viewed as an acceptable substitute for reasoned analysis. See Ely,
supra note 15, at 924 ("Exactly why this is a magic moment is not made clear.., the
Court . . .mistake[s] a definition for a syllogism.").

72 Potential life is the concept of prenatal life that one holds if one rejects the
idea that life begins at conception. Id. at 150. Thus, it follows that viable potential
life must be life which is capable of immediate survival but in which life has not
begun.
73 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057
(1989). Justice Rehnquist stated that, "we do not see why the State's interest in
protecting potential. human life should come into existence only at the point of
viability .. ";id. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he State's compelling
interest in potential life post-viability renders its interest in determining the critical
point of viability equally compelling."); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 784 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting)
("[T]his Court meant what it said in Roe concerning the 'compelling interest' of the
states in potential life after viability ....); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive

Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The State's interest in protecting potential human life exists throughout pregnancy.").
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ing potential life, viable or otherwise, would ever be compelling 4
is because a fetus had already acquired the intrinsic value associated with human life and thus could no longer be described as
potential life.
Furthermore, even if it is conceded that a fetus is only potential life and not life, it is unclear why viability should have this
profound effect upon the calculus of the state's countervailing interest in protecting potential life. The point of viability says
much about medical technology, little about fetuses, and has no
apparent logical connection to the two interests which compete
in the abortion equation-the woman's autonomy interest and
the intrinsic worth of the fetus. 75 This logical difficulty led Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Thornburgh, to observe
that:
The substantiality of [the state's] interest [in protecting prenatal life] is in no way dependent on the probability that the fetus
may be capable of surviving outside the womb at any given
point in its development, as the possibility of fetal survival is
contingent on the state of medical practice and technology,
factors that are in essence morally and constitutionally irrelevant. The State's interest is in the fetus as an entity in itself,
and the character of this entity does not change at the point of
viability under conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly,
the State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability.76
Professor Tribe, taking issue with Justice White's analysis, contends that:
Justice White is surely mistaken when he argues that fetal viability and the state of medical technology are 'morally and
constitutionally irrelevant,' since [the fetus's] continued existence requires an enormous sacrifice by another-and only one
other human being. Unlike the others who lay claim to society's resources 'the sustenance the non-viable fetus needs is
not society's to give. It can only be provided by a particular
pregnant woman.' But once the fetus 'has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb' . . . the responsi74 One can easily conceive of contexts where viability might be relevant to an
abortion related issue. For instance, in determining the constitutionality of a statutory requirement on abortionists to perform procedures designed to enhance the
fetus's chances for survival, relevance of fetal viability is obvious. If the fetus cannot be saved, life saving procedures are pointless and should not be required. See
Fost, Chudwin and Wikler, The Limited Moral Significance of 'Fetal Viability', HASTINGS

CENTER REP.
75
76

10, 12 (Dec. 1980).

Id. at 11-13.

Thornburgh, 475 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

1991]

COMMENT

bility for the nurture that is essential to life can be assumed by
others. . . .,77
The fact that others can assume the burden of caring for the
viable fetus might have been relevant had the Court in Roe required
that a woman, carrying a viable fetus, have the option to terminate
her pregnancy in a manner which preserves the life of the fetus. To
the contrary, it is the very possibility of providing this option that is
the rationale advanced for permitting states to prohibit abortions. 7 8
Prior to viability, the state's interest in protecting fetuses cannot be
advanced without denying the pregnant woman control over her reproductive autonomy. 79 Since both interests cannot be accommodated simultaneously, the Court deemed the reproductive
autonomy interest superior and struck down laws prohibiting abortions of previable fetuses." After viability, the state's interest in
preserving prenatal life and the woman's reproductive autonomy interest can be advanced simultaneously. 8 ' Oddly enough, however,
it is after viability that states are permitted to completely disregard
the woman's reproductive autonomy (previously considered paramount) in its efforts to protect prenatal life. 82 Thus, a state is prohibited from abridging a woman's purported constitutional right
when such abridgment is necessary to advance the state's interest,
yet is permitted to abridge this right when such action is unnecessary. This logic is analogous to permitting a police officer to search
a suspect when he poses no threat to the officer while prohibiting a
similar search when the officer believes the suspect is carrying a concealed weapon.
Contrary to what Professor Tribe suggests, the justification for
discriminating between viable and nonviable fetuses cannot be derived from any decrease in the dependency of the fetus on its mother.
No sense can be made for such discrimination unless one first
presumes that a viable fetus is inherently more valuable than a nonviable fetus.
The Court has had some difficulty articulating this lack of relevancy between viability and the state's interest in protecting fetuses.
In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,83 Justice
77 See L. TRIBE, supra note
78

26, § 15-10, at 1357-58.

Id. at 1358-59.

See id. at 1341.
See id.
See id. at 1357-59.
See id.
462 U.S. 416 (1983). In Akron, the Court invalidated an ordinance requiring
all second trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital. Id. at 431-33. The
79

80
81
82
83
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O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion, observed that "improvements in
medical technology inevitably will move forward the point at which
the State may regulate [abortion] for reasons of maternal health
[while] different technological improvements will move backwards
the point of viability at which the State may proscribe abortion. . .. "" This observation led thejustice to conclude that "[t]he
Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision course with itself]" 8 5 and
was thus "an unworkable means of balancing the fundamental right
and the compelling state interests that are indisputably implicated." 8 6 This observation has been frequently cited in subsequent
legal commentaries criticizing the Roe trimester scheme.8 7
It is somewhat curious that several Justices, as well as several
legal commentators, have found this situation problematic. Even if
technology were to move the critical elements in the Roe trimester
scheme to the point where they collide or even pass one another
and swap positions in the gestational continuum, this would present
no discernable difficulty. Under this scenario, viability would be
achievable after the first trimester and abortion would be safer than
child birth before the end of the second trimester. Under the reasoning in Roe, a state could restrict abortions after the first trimester
in order to protect potential life because the point at which the
state's interest is compelling has been moved forward. After the
second trimester, states could regulate abortions (assuming a state
did not opt to criminalize them after the first trimester) in ways
which advance its interest in protecting maternal health. This would
be workable in practice. It would also be sound in theory if one believes that viability is relevant to determining the intrinsic worth of pre-natal

life.
The criticism that the Roe trimester scheme is on a collision
Court conceded that under Roe, the state's interest in protecting maternal health
becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester because at that point in gestation the health risks of abortion were less than the risks of completing the pregnancy. Id. at 429 & n. 11. The Court noted, however, that post-Roe scientific
developments made at least some second trimester abortion procedures safe in a
properly equipped clinic. Id. at 435-36. Accordingly, the Court determined that
the state statute was overbroad. Id. at 435-38.
84 Id. at 456-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
85 Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86 Id at 458-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87 See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 48, at 641; Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REV. 375, 381 (1985); Rhoden, The
New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEO. L.J. 1451, 1491-92
(1984). Comment, The Supreme Court's Abortion Jurisprudence: Will the Supreme Court
Pass the "Albatross" Back to the States?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 731, 760 & n.153
(1990).
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course with itself reflects an underlying difficulty with the logical
link between viability and the intrinsic worth of prenatal life. This
disquietude is stimulated upon contemplation that technology may
move the point in gestation at which fetuses are viable. The value
and intrinsic worth of prenatal life should not be affected by scientific advances. Under modern technology, viability is~not achieved
until the twenty-fourth week of gestation.8 8 In 1939, however, viability did not occur until the twenty-ninth week of gestation. 8 9 The
idea that the state's interest in protecting the life of a fetus at
twenty-seven weeks of gestation was in some way less compelling in
1939 than in 1989 makes one suspicious of this entire inquiry. If a
twenty-seven week old fetus is worth protecting at a time when science could enable its extra-uterine survival, then it is worth protecting prior to obtaining such technological capabilities. The reverse,
of course, is also true. 90
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 9 Justice Blackmun, dissenting from a plurality opinion upholding a Missouri abortion statute, 92 responded to Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron, arguing
that:
rJustice O'Connor's] critique has no medical foundation....

[Tihere is an 'anatomical threshold' for fetal viability

of about 23-24 weeks gestation.... Moreover, no technology
exists to bridge the development gap between the three day
embryo culture and the 24th week of gestation. Nor does the
medical community believe that ...

such technology is possi-

ble. In other words, the threshold of fetal viability is and will
See supra note 61.
89 Potter & Adair, Factors Associated with Fetal and Neonatal Deaths, 112 J. A.M.A.
1549, 1549 (1939).
90 Professor Tribe defends the viability standard by arguing that:
[A]s technology enhances the ability to relieve the pregnant woman
of the burden of her pregnancy and transfer nurture of the fetus to
other hands, the state's power to protect fetal life expands-as it should.
A viability rule thus allows society to optimize the protection of women and their unborn children by choosing how much to invest in the
technologies pushing viability toward conception.
L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 15-10, at 1357-58 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
This argument fails to address the issue. A viability rule may have the effect
described by Professor Tribe, but a rule which prohibited all abortions except those
where the fetus had a better than fifty percent chance of surviving the procedure
would also have this effect. This, however, does not help one to determine the
value of prenatal life and the state's interest. in protecting it, which was the only
reason that the Court undertook this inquiry.
91 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
92 See id. at 3067.
88
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remain, no different from what it was at the time Roe was decided. Predictions to the contrary are pure science fiction.9"
The conclusion that the Roe trimester scheme is not on a collision course with itself simply will not follow from this argument.
Justice Blackmun ignores the fact that technology continues to advance the point where abortion is safer than birth. 9 Thus, even if
viability is frozen at the 24th week, the collision that Justice
O'Connor forewarned is still approaching. 95 However, unlike scientific developments regarding viability which have no overt logical
relationship to the state's interest in protecting prenatal life, advances in abortion procedures which make them safer at later stages
of pregnancy are logically related to the state's interest in protecting
maternal health.9 6 Thus, the first trimester milestone in the Roe
scheme seems to pass without objection despite the fact that it also
changes with technology.
The Court has not adequately articulated the logical defect in
the viability standard. The trimester scheme is attacked for minor
difficulties which are common to other bodies of constitutional law
and are not overly troublesome. For instance, critics charge that (1)
the trimester scheme utilizes intricate rules more germane to a regulatory code than a constitutional framework,9 7 (2) the key elements,
trimester and viability have no cognizable roots in the text of the
Constitution,9" and (3) the Court is not qualified to make such determinations of medical issues.9 9 If these were the only flaws of the
viability standard it would not be deserving of much attention.'°°
109 S. Ct. at 3075-76 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 43536 (1983), Justice Blackmun joined the Court in recognizing that "the safety of
second trimester abortions ha[d] increased dramatically" since the time of Roe. Id.
See also Rhoden, supra note 48, at 668 ("The threshold of viability is approaching
week 23 [of gestation] but abortion is safer than childbirth past week 21.").
95 Rhoden, supra note 48, at 675.
96 See id. at 656 ("If the state's true motivation is to protect her health, the regulation should seldom seriously conflict with the woman's right to choose a common
and relatively safe medical procedure."). See also Fost, Chudwin & Wikler, supra
note 74, at 13 ("The viability criterion is puzzling in its logic. Why should a fetus's
capacity to live independently be a reason to forbid the mother from forcing it to
live independently").
97 See Ely, supra note 15, at 922.
98 Id. at 934-39.
99 See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 45458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100 Numerous areas of constitutional jurisprudence embody fine distinctions approaching fairly detailed rules which are not derived from the Constitution's text.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (detailing specific disclosure requirements to be applied to defendants in custody before interrogation will be
93

94
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While several members of the Court have criticized the Roe
framework's viability standard as arbitrary,' 0 1 such an argument
only proves a trifle. It is one thing for a standard to be arbitrary; for
it to be illogical, however, is a far more serious matter. Our bodies
of law tolerate a great deal of arbitrariness and constitutional jurisprudence is no exception. Whether one has reached the age of
eighteen quite often determines whether, and to what extent, one
possesses constitutional rights.'0" The peculiar vulnerability and
immaturity of minors, which enables the state to interfere with the
exercise of their constitutional rights, is presumed to disappear on
one's eighteenth birthday. This patently arbitrary classification is
quite logical, however, assuming one believes, as do most persons,
that vulnerability and immaturity are inversely related to one's age.
If, however, the classification were changed to one based on criteria
generally regarded as irrelevant to one's capacity to exercise constitutional rights, such as race, gender, social status, or wealth, any
deemed lawful and statements therefrom admissible into evidence); compare Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding a criminal conviction handed down
by a six member jury against a 6th Amendment challenge) with Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978) (reversing criminal conviction based on verdict of five member
jury); compare Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding convictions
where jury vote supporting verdict was 11-1 and 10-2) with Burch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130 (1979) (reversing misdemeanor conviction based on jury vote of 5-1).
Terms not found in the Constitution's text but which describe significant constitutional distinctions include: commercial speech, see Bd. of Trustees of State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989) (entitled to less First Amendment protection than other types of speech); curtilage, see California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986) (area near one's home entitled to greater fourth amendment protection than other private property outside one's dwelling); and suspect
class, see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988) (statutes disadvantaging members are more rigorously scrutinized than statutes disadvantaging other population groups).
The Court frequently involves itself in areas where it has little or no expertise,
such as education, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954);
sociology, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972); ethics, see Ohrailik
v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 460-62 (1978); and economics, see Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773 (1945). Moreover, Roe v. Wade was not the
Court's initial entry into areas touching medicine. See, e.g.,Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (Court upheld statute requiring individuals to submit to
smallpox vaccination).
101 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986) (White, J, dissenting); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102 See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (trial by jury in juvenile proceedings is not constitutionally required); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (upholding application of child labor statute which prevented a child
from distributing religious literature); Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F.Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding statute which prohibited minors
form marrying without parental consent).
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claims to legitimacy collapse. Thus, an attack upon the viability
standard for its arbitrariness only serves to deflect criticism from its
more serious logical flaw.' 05
PART II
The Value of PrenatalLife, Cognitive Ability and Viability's Significance
The Roe Court was faced with three options. It could have:
(1) permitted states to protect all fetuses, (2) prohibited states
from protecting any fetuses, or (3) allowed states to protect
some, but not all, fetuses. In selecting the third option, the
Court was in need of some mechanism for excluding some fetuses from state protection. The rationale behind the Court's
choice of the viability standard is unclear. Viability was, however,
something of a scientific concept, thereby bearing science's imprimatur. This, in turn, added credibility to the viability standard. °4 The fact that science's answer (viability is achieved at
the twenty-fourth week of gestation) was not germane to the
abortion question (which fetuses are valuable) - either went unnoticed by the Roe Court or was not considered significant.
The impression one derives from Roe is that viability is determinative of whether the state's interest is compelling and the fact
that this occurs at the twenty-fourth week of gestation is an irrelevant coincidence.' 0 5 In a widely quoted article, Professor
Rhoden argues that what the Court really meant or would have
meant had it thoroughly analyzed viability's significance, 10 6 was
that the twenty-fourth week itself was the determinative factor,
and viability was merely the irrelevant coincidence. 10 7 Professor
Rhoden claims that viability denotes two separate concepts, one
technological and one normative. 10 8 The technological concept
(fetal survivability) is not a relevant measure of the state's interest.' 0 9 In contrast, the normative concept which "encompasses
103 The Roe Court asserted that the viability standard had a "logical as well as
biological" justification. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). This assertion
has been rejected by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 48, at
664-65; Wertheimer, Understanding Blackmun's Argument: The Reasoning of Roe v.
Wade, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 120 (1984); Robertson,
Medicolegal Implications of a Human Life Amendment, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 166 (1983).
104 See Rhoden, supra note 48, at 668-69.
105 Id. at 670.
106 Id. at 671-72.
107 Id. at 669-70.
108 Id. at 671.
109 Id.
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the idea that the fetus is so substantially developed that it has a
claim to societal protection" is relevant."
Professor Rhoden uses the separate terms "Viability," (technological survivability) and "Viability 2 " (substantial fetal development) to avoid confusion which inevitably ensues when
separate concepts are denoted by a single word or phrase."' She
contends that Viability 2 is a " 'cluster concept'-a concept made
up of several important components, none of which is sufficient to define it."11 2 Thus, she concludes that the sole merit of the viability
standard is that it divides pregnancy (under 1973 medical technology) in a manner which approximates the division mandated
by a standard based on these "several important components."' '3 Stated another way, the viability standard camouflages
a different standard which as yet remains undefined.
These "Several Important Components"
In order to understand the problems arising from operating
under a rule of law based on unspecified criteria, it might be
helpful to first speculate as to what constitutes these several important components. If not viability, what is it that leads the
Court to believe that only those fetuses which have reached the
twenty-fourth week of gestation are rightful subjects of the state's
protection? The Court's reticence in discussing the alleged syllogistic defects of the viability standard makes it difficult to answer
this question." 4 What can be gleaned from the cases, however,
particularly the Court's response to criticism from its own members, is that fetal cognitive ability plays a dominant role.' 5
Criticisms of the viability standard first centered on arbitrary
distinctions between viable and nonviable fetuses." 6 This led
several members of the Court to reject the viability standard altogether and hold that the state's interest in protecting prenatal life
is compelling throughout pregnancy, and not merely after the
point of viability. 1 7 This conclusion, however, does not neces110 Id.

111 Id.
112 Id. at 672 (emphasis supplied).
113 Id. at 670-73.
114 See infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 117-145 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057
(1989) ("The State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling
before viability.") (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)); Thornburgh, 476
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sarily follow from its premise. The mere fact that viability is not a
useful indicator of the intrinsic worth of prenatal human life, and
therefore a poor measure of the state's interest, does not necessarily mean that at every point in gestation the state's interest is
considered compelling.

In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology,"

8

Justice Stevens, responding to the dissent's contention that the
state's interest is compelling throughout pregnancy, argued the
following:
The State's interest . . .in the protection of an embryo ...

increases dramatically as the organism's capacity to feel pain,
to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by day. The development of a fetusand pregnancy itself-are not static conditions, and the assertion that the government's interest is static simply ignores this
reality ....There is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being ....

Recognition of

this distinction is supported, 1not
only by logic, but by history
9
and our shared experiences.
Justice Stevens's observation strongly challenges the dissent's
contention in Thornburgh that the state's interest in prenatal life is
equally compelling throughout pregnancy.12 0 Rather than vindicate
the viability standard, however, this argument does more to undermine its validity. Justice Stevens enumerated four factors which he
viewed as relevant to the strength of the state's interest.' 21 Three of
the four factors relate to the fetus's cognitive ability and are wholly
U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I remain of the view []... [that the] State
has [a] compelling interest in ...protecting potential human life and that interest
exists throughout pregnancy."); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 460 (1983) (O'Connor, J, dissenting) ("the State's interest in
potential life is . . . extant throughout pregnancy").
118 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
119 Id. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' statement was quoted
by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Webster, in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined. See Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120 The strength of the argument depends on how one determines the value to
be attached to human life. If one bases this value on membership in the species,
this interest will not increase during pregnancy and the state's interest is indeed
compelling throughout pregnancy. If, however, one bases this value on factors that
vary during gestation, the measure of the state's interest will change, presumably
increase, as pregnancy progresses. Professor May argued that:
The major area of disagreement between those who defend abortion
and those who oppose abortion ... comes down to the question: Is
humanity, in the sense of being an entity that is the subject of rights,
an endowment or an achievement?
May, Abortion and Man's Moral Being, in ABORTION: PRO AND CON 23-24 (1974).
121 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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unrelated to viability. The reader is left wondering whether viability
or the fetus's development of higher cognitive ability is determinative of when the state's interest becomes compelling.
The link between the intrinsic worth of. human life and the
unique cognitive ability of humans is perhaps more visible in the
analysis by several Court members of life's value at its opposite extreme. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,'2 2 the
Court was presented with the question of whether a state can prevent the guardians of Nancy Cruzan, a permanently comatose ward,
from effecting the ward's death by discontinuing artificial nutrition
and hydration.'
In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the Constitution does not proscribe a state
from demanding clear and convincing evidence that death comports
with an incompetent ward's wishes before it permits conduct which
will result in the ward's death.1 24 The plurality neither decided the
question of whether the right to discontinue essential medical treatment is constitutionally protected nor whether the state would have
a compelling interest in protecting life to an extent sufficient to
25
override that privacy interest.
The Cruzan Court was splintered along the same lines as it was
in the more recent abortion cases. 12 6 Four members of the Cruzan
Court-the same four members who consistently vote to strike
down state abortion statutes-dissented from the Court's opinion
and held that the guardians' efforts to discontinue artifical nutrition
and hydration were constitutionally protected. 2 7 In addition to
finding that the state's conduct impeded a constitutionally protected
privacy interest, 28 the dissenting Justices found that the state's in110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
Id. at 2846.
Id. at 2856.
See id. at 2851-52.
Compare Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (Chief justice Rehnquist delivered a
plurality opinion joined by justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. justices
O'Connor and Scalia wrote separate concurring opinions. justice Brennan dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, and justice Stevens
wrote a separate dissenting opinion) with Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
Inc., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (Plurality opinion upholding a Missouri statute which,
by restricting certain abortion procedures, arguably contravened the Court's holding in Roe. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a plurality opinion joined by justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia (in part), and Kennedy. justices O'Connor and Scalia
wrote separate concurring opinions. justice Blackmun dissented in an opinion
joined by justices Brennan and Marshall and justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion).
127 See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863-2878 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2878-92
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 See id. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2878-79 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
122
123
124
125
126
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terest in protecting the life of Nancy Cruzan was insufficient to over29
come this privacy interest. 1
Not surprisingly, the Cruzan dissents' analysis of the state's
countervailing interest in protecting human life had some interesting parallels with those accompanying the abortion decisions.' 30
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, attempted to merge the
definition of the word "life" with the more abstract concept of personhood by injecting normative concepts suggesting value.' 3 ' In
contrast with the Roe Court, however, Justice Stevens at least acknowledged that he was doing this.' 32 Moreover, the dissent (as
well as the plurality) repeatedly described Nancy Cruzan's condition
as a "persistent vegetative state."' 3 3 Thus, as in Roe, the Court enlisted the aid of a metaphor to dehumanize the object whose termination was the subject of the litigation in order to overcome the
innate predilection against killing one's own kind.l" In addition,
there was a curious avoidance of the word "kill" throughout both
dissenting opinions.'" 5 The dissenting Justices maintained that the
129 See id. at 2861 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This is the paradigm used by the Court to evaluate whether a statute violates the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. The Court first determines whether the
law significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right. If this inquiry
is answered in the affirmative, the Court proceeds to evaluate whether the statute
advances a sufficiently important state interest. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (holding that a statute which interferes with the fundamental
right of marriage cannot be upheld unless supported by a sufficiently important
state interest); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690 (1977) (requiring a compelling state interest in order to uphold a statute restricting the availability of contraceptives); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(determining that an ordinance which interferes with one's basic right to co-habitate with blood relatives must be invalidated unless supported by an overriding
governmental interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding that abortions may be restricted only for the purpose of advancing a compelling state
interest).
130 See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
131 See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2887 (StevensJ., dissenting) ("absent some theological abstraction, the idea of life is not conceived separately from the idea of a living
person."); id. at 2891-92 (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("The consequence of the Court's
theory [recognizing the state's unqualified interest in preserving life] is to deny...
personhood of those whose lives are defined by the State's interests rather than
their own.").
132 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Nancy Cruzan is obviously 'alive' in a physiological sense. But for patients ... who have no consciousness . . .there is a serious question as to whether the mere persistence of their
bodies is 'life' as that word is commonly understood .... ).
133 Id. at 2863-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2878-92 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
134 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
135 See Cnuzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2863-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2878-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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guardians merely wished to let "nature ... take its course, 36 which
in this case involved letting Nancy Cruzan die of starvation and dehydration.' 3 7 To their credit, none of the dissenting justices in
Cruzan maintained that the dispositive issue was "when life ends."
Both the dissent and the plurality made repeated references to
Nancy Cruzan's lack of cognitive ability,' 3 8 yet never indicated the
legal significance of this reference.' 39 One must presume that a lack
of cognitive ability bears on the efficacy of the state's countervailing
interest in preserving Nancy Cruzan's life. 4 ° The dissent maintained that "no State interest could outweigh the [constitutional]
rights of an individual in Nancy Cruzan's position [to be free of unThe dissent never squarely adwanted medical intervention]."''
dressed the potential implications of this statement. If the patient's
choice to reject treatment is always more important than the state's
interest in protecting the patient's life, a person who suffers from a
life threatening but easily curable infirmity has an equally compelling constitutional right to discontinue treatment and accept
death.' 4 Only a distinction between medical treatment and nontreatment 4 3 prevents this "liberty" from being extended to persons
44
who suffer no infirmity whatsoever but nonetheless wish to die.'
136 Id. at 2863 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rassmussen v. Flemming, 154
Ariz. 207, 211, 714 P.2d 674, 678 (1987) (en banc).
137 See id. at 2845-46. The absurdity of this position becomes apparent if one
considers what would happen if the guardians had won their case but the doctor
removed the feeding tube from a recovering patient, mistaking her for Nancy
Cruzan. The doctor would have difficulty explaining that he had not killed the patient, but that death resulted from the underlying infirmity.
138 See id. 110 S. Ct. 2845-56; id. at 2863-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 287892 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 See id.
140 The only other alternative presumption would be that the Court views those
who lack higher cognitive ability as having greater rights under the fourteenth
amendment. The Court, however, rejected this position. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at
2852.
141 Id. at 2869.
142 The petitioners in Cruzan were quite explicit on this point. See Cruzan, 110 S.
Ct. at 2852 ("[An incompetent person should possess the same right [to refuse life
saving treatment] as is possessed by a competent person.").
143 Id. at 2865-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing a fundamental right to
avoid life essential medical treatment).
144 Justice Scalia, in a separate concurring opinion, noted that:
The dissents of Justices Brennan and Stevens . . . embrace[] ...
[a] principle that the State[] . .. has no legitimate... interest in someone's life.., that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical
treatment. [B]ut the proposition cannot logically be so limited....
One who accepts it must also accept ... that the State has no such
legitimate interest that could outweigh the person's choice to put an
For insofar as balancing the relative interests of
end to her life ....
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This line of reasoning will inexorably lead to the judicial sanction of suicide unless it is implicitly understood that the state has a
lesser interest in preserving the life of Nancy Cruzan than it has in
preserving the lives of other members of the community. The only
distinction between Nancy Cruzan's situation and that of any other
person is the deterioration in her cognitive ability. Thus, any jurisprudential approach which would proscribe a state's efforts to prevent severely brain injured persons from terminating their lives, but
would permit such efforts with respect to other persons, must presume that the lives of those who lack higher cognitive abilities are of
lesser value.
With respect to the criteria for measuring the value of human
life, the position taken by the dissenting Justices in Cruzan is entirely
consistent with their position in abortion cases: the state's interest
in protecting the life of the severely brain injured individual is not
compelling for the same reason that its interest in protecting the
nonviable fetus is not compelling - both brain injured individuals
and nonviable fetuses lack the appropriate measure of cognitive
45
ability and for that reason lack sufficient value.'
Thus, the viability standard appears to be derived from a philosophy which equates the value of human life with human beings'
higher cognitive ability. Merely to equate human value with cognitive ability, however, will not yield a viability standard unless this
philosophy is combined with a presumption that, at approximately
the same time at which science enables extra-uterine survival, the
fetus has developed sufficient cognitive ability to justify the state's
protective efforts. Is this presumption valid? This question cannot
be answered and thus the hazard of leaving these several important
components undefined and relying upon the viability standard
merely because it comports with intuitions about when in gestation
the State and the individual... there is nothing distinctive about accepting death through the refusal of 'medical treatment,' as opposed
to accepting it through the refusal of food.... Suppose that Nancy
Cruzan were in precisely the condition she is in today, except that she
could be fed and digest food and water without artificial assistance.
How is the State's 'interest' in keeping her alive thereby increased, or
her interest in deciding whether she wants to continue living reduced?
[J]ustice Brennan's position ultimately rests upon the proposition that
it is none of the State's business if a person wants to commit suicide.
Justice Stevens is explicit on the point: 'Choices about death touch the
core of liberty . . . and that alone is reason enough to protect the
freedom to conform choices about death to individual conscience.'
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2862 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations and emphases omitted).
145 See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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life becomes valuable, is apparent."'
These unexpressed components may have no more relevance to
the value of prenatal life than viability. There is reason to suspect
that some of the criteria considered for measuring fetal worth have
little to do with the, fetus and more to do with the availability of
abortions. 1 4 7 For instance, in attempting to ascertain the proper
point in gestation at which the state can assert its interest is protecting the fetus, one legal commentator argued that this point should
not precede the twenty-second week of gestation because certain
birth defects can only be discovered immediately prior to that
time. 148 Justice Blackmun expressed similar sentiments when, in
Webster, he defended the viability standard as a proper determinant
of the state's interest because9 it provided a pregnant woman ample
14
time to obtain an abortion.
Notwithstanding the practical merit of these considerations, it
must be recognized that the right which is being asserted in these
arguments is different from the one created by the Roe Court. In
Roe, the Court recognized a right to obtain an abortion except
where this would derogate from a compelling interest which the
state opted to assert."' The foregoing statements suggest that this
right is being redefined to protect a woman's ability to obtain an
abortion, compelling countervailing interests notwithstanding, with
sloth on the part of the woman constituting the only exception.' 5 '
While this approach avoids the central problem-that of determining when to regard a fetus as worthy of protection-there are compelling reasons militating against allowing the effect on the ability to
obtain an abortion to prejudice one's analysis of the state's interest.
As Professor Devine aptly stated:
Whatever the extent to which the interest of a given person
might legitimately be sacrificed for the good of the commuSee supra notes 111-113.
See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
See Rhoden, supra note 48, at 682-83.
149 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3075 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Webster, Justice Blackmun noted that viability follows
quickening, the point when the pregnant woman can sense fetal movement. See id.
The fetus actually has been moving vigorously for a substantial period prior to its
hosts detection. See S. KrrZINGER, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 63 (1982). What relevance can quickening have except to resolve doubt in
the woman as to whether she is pregnant, thus providing her one last chance to
procure an abortion?
150 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
151 See Rhoden, supra note 48, at 683 (Professor Rhoden candidly characterizes
the judicial function as "protecting women's privacy rights for a substantial portion
of pregnancy.").
146
147
148
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nity, it seems intolerable that a creature should be regarded as
not a person-and hence of next to no account in moral deliberation-simply because it is ...in the interests of others to so
regard that creature.... To proceed in such a manner would
be to overthrow some
of the most fundamental elements of
52
our moral tradition. 1
Furthermore, there is reason to suspect that any analysis of the
state's interest in protecting prenatal life is heavily prejudiced by the
more nearly human appearance and resulting emotional identification 153 with the mature fetus.154 For example, Professor Cahill
noted that "the increasingly human appearance of offspring during
gestation may be relevant to their developing status in the human
community."' 15 5 Unlike others, however, who are made the object
of discrimination by virtue of their appearance, the fetus is not in a
position to plead its worth. As a result, the norms and values which
govern the proper treatment of a mature fetus may be abrogated for
less developed fetuses where differences in their intrinsic value,
when measured by more relevant criteria, would not warrant such
156
disparate treatment.
Finally, even if it is assumed that this undefined standard is
somehow based on morally relevant criteria, there still exists the risk
that the data on which any conclusions as to fetal worth is based is
inaccurate. While such a risk exists in any adjudication, it is particularly acute where the operative rule of law is based on unspecified
criteria. Since the information that the Court finds important in
evaluating fetal worth is never indicated, it is impossible to determine whether the information on which the Court relies for its understanding of the nature and attributes of the fetus at various
points in gestation is accurate. It is noteworthy that although Justices Blackmun and Stevens have indicated that they find the fetus's
capacity to feel pain, experience pleasure, and to react to its surroundings indicative of the fetus's value,' 5 7 neither Justice examines
152

p. DEVINE,

THE

ETHICS

OF HOMICIDE,

80-81 (1978).

153 "Appearance" is used here in the general sense of how one is perceived in

contradistinction to strictly observable appearance.
154 P. DEVINE, supra note 152, at 81. One study noted that when women who
were seeking an abortion were shown an ultrasonogram of their fetus, they frequently declined to undergo the procedure. See J. Fletcher and M. Evans, Maternal
Bonding in Early Fetal Ultrasound Examinations, 7 NEW ENG. JOUR. OF MED. 308, 392
(1983).
155 Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy, and Community, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 270 (1984).
156 P. DEVINE, supra note 152, at 81.
157 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3075 (1989)
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whether the fetus has any of these capabilities prior to viability. 158
What Might Have Been
It is important to compare the current abortion jurisprudential model with that which would have existed had the Court inquired into and reached a consensus on whether the fetus's
development of some measure of higher cognitive ability, rather
than viability, was the determinant of when the state's interest in
protecting prenatal life is compelling. The Court would be called
upon to justify its selection of cognitive ability as the criterion for
fetal worth, as well as determine what measure of cognitive ability would indicate that the fetus has attained sufficient value and
thus qualify to receive protection from the state. The Court
could enlist the aid of science to provide information (which
could be tested in court) from which it could be determined at
approximately what point in gestation the fetus is possessed of
this measure of cognitive ability. From this, the Court could
fashion a value threshold beyond which states may proscribe
abortion. Assuming the Court placed this value threshold at the
twenty-fourth week of gestation, the fact that the fetus had
reached this value threshold at approximately the same point in
gestation when modem science could enable the fetus to survive
outside the womb would be regarded as nothing more than a coincidence. This coincidence has not occurred in the past nor
need it occur in the future. Because attributes of fetal cognitive
development at various points in gestation remain constant even
though medical science may enable extra-uterine survival at earlier points in gestation, the value threshold would remain fixed at
one point in gestation although it might one day no longer coincide with viability. The point in gestation at which the fetus is
technologically viable, for the purposes of measuring the state's
interest, would be irrelevant.
Adoption of such a methodology would essentially be the rejection of the viability standard as it is currently understood in
favor of a cognitive ability standard. Interestingly, modern philosophical commentary on the dilemma posed by abortion and
abortion regulation has focused on fetal cognitive ability for
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S., 747, 778-79 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
158 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
at 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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quite some time.' 59 Within this apparent consensus, however,
there is great variance among contemporary philosophers as to
the minimum-quantum of cognitive ability required for personhood. This is evidenced by the various indicators of personhood which are being proffered. They include: (1) capacity
for thinking, (2) awareness of consciousness, (3) onset of brain
waives, (4) sentience, (5) development of the concept of self, (6)
development of the capacity for pleasure or pain, (7) reasoning
ability, (8) capacity for self-motivated activity, and (8) capacity to
communicate in some form.16 °
Adoption of any of these standards for fetal worth would entail some rather interesting problems. For example, some of the
proposed attributes of higher cognitive ability are not attained
until long after birth. Furthermore, some adult members of the
community, such as the mentally handicapped, may never possess some of these attributes. The embarrassing result which
logic requires reflects poorly upon the underlying philosophical
premise that value should be linked to cognitive ability. While
there are some philosophical commentators who possess the intellectual honesty to carry their theories to their logical conclusions, '61 no legal commentators openly advance the idea that the

state does not have a compelling interest in regulating infanticide. 162 But since the introduction of a newborn into one's life
can interfere with one's autonomy in ways that a fetus never
could, it must be recognized that definitions of6 value which are
applied to fetuses may be extended to infants. 1
Adoption of a cognitive ability standard will not be without
its critics. First, there are many who vigorously protest basing
159 Commentary suggesting that viability or membership in the species is particularly relevant to the abortion dilemma is scarce. Wilder, supra note 20, at 19.
160 See Wilder, supra note 20, at 20; Macklin, Two Persons, One Body, in DEFINING
HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 230 (1983).
161 See, e.g., M. TooLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 407-19 (1983). Professor
Tooley argues that since newborn infants lack higher mental capacities, infanticide,
like abortion, is not morally wrong. Id. See also G. BALL, CHRISTIANITY IN CRISIS 274
(Oct. 19, 1981). Professor Ball believes that "consciousness of self" is the litmus
test for humanness and describes those who do not possess this ability as mere
animals. Id. Thus, he concludes that "a newborn infant is not a human being."
162 Wilder, supra note 20, at 21.
163 Id. ("The pro-choice advocate cannot simultaneously use a psychological
concept of personhood to declare fetuses to be nonpersons, yet abandon that same
concept when applied to infants."). Id. See also M. TOOLEY, supra note 161, at 423.
(Professor Tooley maintained that "if one discusses ... the morality of abortion in
isolation from the question[] of the morality of infanticide .... one would wind up
with a combination of views that is not rationally tenable ....
Either abortion is
morally suspect, or infanticide is morally permissible ..
").

1991]

COMMENT

377

one's value on one's cognitive ability. 64 Second, even if consensus existed among the public that the value which society attaches to human life is grounded in a human being's unique
cognitive ability, there is no prevailing consensus as to what measure of cognitive ability should form the value threshold.' 6 5
These issues cannot be resolved here. Collective wisdom
and reason may ultimately resolve them in favor of placing the
threshold for fetal worth either before or after the twenty-fourth
week of gestation or even rejecting cognitive ability entirely as a
valid measure of the value of life. But as long as the Court insists
that viability is the only relevant standard, far from being discussed or resolved, these issues will not even be raised. By insulating the Court from these issues, the adoption of the viability
standard has effectively placed constitutional abortion adjudication under secret law.
PART III
The Need to Re-examine the Value of PrenatalLife From Roe to Webster
If the Court were to achieve consensus on the controlling
philosophy in the abortion debate, the debate would probably
end. The determination of whether abortion more closely resembles infanticide or contraception would quickly render the
other arguments for and against abortion either insufficient or
unnecessary.'" Nonetheless, since its 1973 abortion decisions,
164 See Wikler, supra note 20, at 19. Professor Wikler observed that the principle
that one's value is predicated on membership in the species has deep roots in our
value structure. He noted that:
[W]hatever its origin, the principle seems to be assumed or imbedded
in much of our ordinary thinking about morality. So called "human
Rights", for example, are rights ascribed to humans on no other basis
than membership in our species. We demonstrate our respect for
these rights in countless ways (though they are, of course often violated). For example, profoundly retarded humans are protected from
the same dangerous medical experiments that we routinely perform
on relatively intelligent animals.
d.; see also May, supra note 120, at 23-24.
165 See Wikler, supra note 20, at 20-21. Professor Wikler noted: "We find in philosophical writing not one but many distinct psychological concepts of personhood.
This unwelcome variety would not matter for the abortion debate if the several
versions implied similar starting points for development of personhood in fetuses.
This, however, is not ... the case." Id. Observe the vast disparity among philosophers regarding the requisites for personhood. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
166 Epstein, supra note 19, at 176 (discussing the psychological, mental, physical
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the Court has directed very little discussion toward the underlying philosophy by which it determines the strength of the state's
countervailing interest in protecting prenatal life. Part of the
Court's failure to reconsider the viability standard can be explained by the fact that in many post-Roe abortion decisions the
interest, at least overtly advanced by the state, was something
other than the protection of prenatal life. Post-Roe statutory impediments to abortion were enacted in order to protect the rights
of the father,

67

the pregnant minor's parents,16

or even the

pregnant woman.' 69 Having been told by the Court in Roe that
protecting prenatal life was an insufficient justification for restricting abortions,t17 states unsuccessfully attempted to advance
alternative justifications as a pretext. 17 In most cases, the extent
and economic consequences attending an unwanted pregnancy and noting that
none of these reasons would justify infanticide).
167 See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-70
(1976) (invalidating a statutory requirement that married women obtain spousal
consent prior to undergoing an abortion).
168 See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2930-31 (1990) (invalidating a
statute which required notification of both parents prior to performing abortion
upon woman under age 18); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2972, 2977 (1990) (upholding a statute prohibiting abortions upon women
under age 18 absent notice to one parent or a court order granting approval); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983) (invalidating an ordinance requiring women under the age of 15 to obtain parental
consent prior to obtaining an abortion, for failure to contain ajudicial bypass provision); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) (upholding a statutory requirement that parents be notified before a minor can receive an abortion); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622,646-47 (1979) (upholding a statute requiring parental consent
or a court order granting approval before a minor could obtain an abortion);
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-70 (1976)
(invalidating a statutory requirement that unmarried women obtain spousal consent before receiving an abortion).
169 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 764 (1986) (invalidating an ordinance requiring detailed information to
be disclosed to pregnant woman prior to obtaining an abortion); Planned
Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983) (invalidating a
statutory requirement that all abortions performed after the twelfth week of pregnancy be performed in hospitals); Akron, 462 U.S. at 435-36 (limiting an ordinance
requiring all second trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals, so as to exclude from the ordinance those abortions which could be performed safely in an
outpatient clinic); id. at 448-49 (invalidating informed consent requirements); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 (upholding prior written consent requirements).
170 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
171 The Supreme Court has demonstrated an unusual hostility toward state regulations which, although not prohibiting abortions, increase the burdens of obtaining one. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (holding that informed consent
requirements, designed to dissuade women from exercising their rights to obtain
abortions, are overinclusive); Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 (invalidating informed consent
requirements as a pretext to deter abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454-55
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of the analysis offered by the members of the Court consists of
either an incantation of the holding in Roe172 or the contrary assertion that the interest in a nonviable fetus is compelling., 73
The sole effort by any member of the Court to add to the Roe
Court's rationale for discriminating among fetuses based on viability is found injustice Blackmun's dissent in Webster. In defending the viability standard, Justice Blackmun argued that:
viability .

.

. marks that threshold moment prior to which a

(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Since efforts to overturn [Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton] have been unsuccessful, the opponents of abortion have attempted every
imaginable means to circumvent.., the Constitution.").
172 See, e.g., Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 482; Akron, 462 U.S. at 428; Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 313 (1980); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 472 (1977); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 61.
In Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), this reason-by-assertion further deteriorated to argumentum ad hominem. Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, engaged
the dissenting Justice White in a colloquy as to whether the state's interest in protecting the fetus was compelling throughout pregnancy. Compare Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the state's interest in protecting
prenatal life increases as gestation advances) with id. at 795 n.4 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state's interest is equally compelling before and after viability). Justice White claimed that the government's interest in protecting the fetus is
compelling from the moment of conception. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 n.4
(White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens responded that this was a religious or theological argument and that the Court's jurisdiction was limited to the evaluation of
secular interests. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice
White countered that this is no more a religious view than was the Court's view that
the state's interest did not become compelling until the fetus is viable. Id. at 795
n.4 (White, J., dissenting). As Justice White noted, it is well settled that a statute is
not invalid merely because it happens to comport with the beliefs of one or more
religious groups' dogmas. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (citing
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). Attempts to characterize the
competing views as "religious" are therefore peculiar. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795
n.4.
Justice Stevens reasserted this view with more direct force in Webster where he
held, in a separate dissenting opinion that the preamble to a Missouri statute declaring that life begins at conception served no secular purpose and thus violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3082 (1989) (Stevens,J, concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Interestingly, neither party nor the United States as amicus curiae suggested
either in their briefs or at oral argument that the Missouri statute implicated the
establishment clause. See generally Brief for Appellant, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Brief for Appellee, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989); Transcriptof OralArgument Before Court on Abortion Case, The N.Y. Times,
April 27, 1989, at B12-B14 [hereinafter Transcript]. Further, the plaintiffs would
not have standing to assert any such rights under the establishment clause. See
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1952) (dismissing appeal
for want of standing where appellant alleged an establishment clause violation but
failed to demonstrate a direct financial injury resulting from the state's action).
173 See supra note 117.
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fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or
interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant
woman. At the same time.., it establishes an easily applicable
standard for regulating abortion while providing a pregnant
her fundamental right . . .to
woman ample time to exercise
74

terminate her pregnancy.'

There are four separate claims to be distilled here. According
to Justice Blackmun, the viability standard properly segregates those
fetuses in which the state has a compelling interest in protecting because prior to viability:
(1) the fetus cannot survive separate from the woman
(2) the fetus cannot be regarded as a subject of interests distinct from those of the pregnant woman
(3) the fetus cannot be regarded as a subject of rights paramount to those its mother and
(4) a woman might
not have had ample opportunity to obtain
75
an abortion.'

The first claim is merely a repeat of the definition of viability
offered by the Roe Court in lieu of the required syllogism. 176 With
respect to the second claim the interests of the fetus and its mother
who seeks to abort it are in fact adverse. The third claim, that a
fetus cannot be regarded as a subject of interest paramount to those
of the pregnant woman, is no more than a restatement of the conclusion. Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that viability "establishes
an easily applicable standard for regulating abortion while providing a pregnant woman ample time to exercise [her] fundamental
right . . . to terminate her pregnancy."' 17 7 More can be discerned
from this statement than perhaps was intended. A state's interest in
protecting a particular group of fetuses either is or is not compelling. Whether this determination affords the pregnant woman the
opportunity to obtain an abortion does not make that interest any
more or less compelling. The trimester scheme was originally advanced as a means for determining whether the state's interest in
protecting the fetus is compelling in order to determine whether the
state could prohibit abortions.1 7 It was never intended, at least
overtly, as a means for guaranteeing the availability of an abortion
to the pregnant woman regardless of any countervailing interests.
174 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun,

J., dissenting).

175 See id. at 3075-79.
176

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

177 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
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Thus, the Court, from the time of Roe until the present, has failed to
provide a satisfactory explanation for why the state's interest in fostering prenatal life is not compelling prior to viability.
CONCLUSION
In Roe, the Supreme Court evaded a forthright analysis of
the central question in the abortion issue-how is the value of life
measured and when does it attach to the fetus. Instead, the
Court fashioned a viability standard. Since Roe, the Court has
not reconsidered the viability standard despite continuous criticism of the Roe decision itself and the viability standard in particular. The Court's insistence on adhering to the viability standard
represents a failure to carry out its obligations "which include
not merely reaching just decisions and doing so for good and
sufficient reason, but also adequately informing the nation's citizenry..., of the rationale for the legal order it imposes."' 179 The
only avenue for advancing the jurisprudential debate regarding
abortion is to attempt to redefine the criteria by which the value
of prenatal life is determined.
Such a jurisprudential debate would more closely match the
true social dilemma posed by abortion and abortion regulations.
While reversal of Roe v. Wade is frequently advocated, 18 0 the line
of cases upon which it is based-recognizing unenumerated fundamental rights-is often carefully distinguished.1 8s The American public places an unusually high value on personal autonomy
and believes that there are certain areas of life where the government has no rightful place. Public opposition to mandatory
82
seatbelt laws, for instance, can be explained in no other way.1
Statements that the United States Constitution contains no right
to privacy are not in accord with that sentiment. But for the effect abortion has on the fetus, few would be troubled by abortion
on demand. The real sentiment which underlies the hostility to
Roe is that the Court unduly denigrated the fetus.
Wertheimer, supra note 103, at 106.
180 In Webster, the appellants and the United States as amicus curiae requested
that the Court re-examine and reverse Roe v. Wade. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
181 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 11-15, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989); Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 25-30; Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
182 See Buckle or Bag?, The Economist, December 6, 1986, at 50 (Massachusetts
and Nebraska repealed mandatory seatbelt laws, reflecting "widespread resistance
to government regulation.").
179
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Further, it is unlikely that the Court will discard the substantive due process doctrine, for "the doctrine has been embraced
83
by conservative as well as liberal justices for quite some time."
Consideration of a cognitive ability standard (or any other standard based on relevant criteria) would at least squarely confront
the single issue on which this nation is so profoundly dividedwhat value is to be accorded to fetuses and what rights should
states have to protect them given the indisputably burdensome
consequences. By moving the focus in the abortion debate from
fundamental rights to countervailing interests the arguments advanced by anti-abortion advocates would at least be congruent
with their true sentiments.
The purpose of this comment is not to advocate the adoption of a cognitive ability standard for the constitutional jurisprudence of abortion regulations. Rather, its purpose is to
demonstrate that in many ways cognitive ability already is the
standard and lies a scratch beneath the surface of the viability
standard. The cognitive ability standard should be stripped of its
viability facade and scrutinized to determine if it indeed is a desirable standard. In any case, the viability standard is useless as
an indicator of the strength of the state's interest in protecting
prenatal life and should be discarded.
Since its 1973 abortion decisions, the Court has not ruled on
the constitutionality of a statute which conflicts with the central
holding of Roe.' 8 4 Litigation has centered on peripheral issues,
some of which were alluded to in Roe.185 These cases functioned
R. Meyers, Prolife Litigation and the American Civil Liberty Tradition, in ABORTION
36 (1987); See also Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 113 (1976) ("The Court's persistent resort to notions of substantive
due process for almost a century attests to the strength of our natural law inheritance in Constitutional adjudication and I think it unwise, as well as hopeless, to
resist it.").
184 Recently, a federal court enjoined a Guam statute which would have outlawed
virtually all abortions. See Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada,
No. 90-00013 (D. Guam Aug. 23, 1990) (Lexis 11910). The case has been appealed
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Guam to Appeal Striking Down of Abortion
Curbs, The N.Y. Times, September 22, 1990, at A8.
185 For a brief review of the case law discussing these issues, see supra notes 167169 and accompanying text. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321-23 (1980)
(upholding medicaid restrictions which precluded funding abortions while providing funding for all other pregnancy related medical procedures); Simopoulos v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 510-19 (1983) (upholding Virginia statute restricting abortions to hospitals or licensed outpatient care facilities); Planned Parenthoodof Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (invalidating Missouri statute proscribing the use of the saline-amniocentesis method of abortion); Webster, 109 S. Ct.
at 3054-56 (upholding regulations mandating procedures to be performed prior to
183
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or assailing18 7 the validity Of Roe

than for application of the Roe principles to the particular statute
under review. As one commentator noted, adherence to the Roe
precedent among the members of the Court has steadily
eroded.' 88 A review of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
Inc. ,t19 the Court's most recent opportunity to reconsider viabilperforming an abortion to determine whether the fetus is viable); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-71 (1986)
(invalidating Pennsylvania statute requiring that the selected abortion technique be
that which maximizes the chance of the fetus's survival unless this procedure significantly increased the risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979) (invalidating Pennsylvania statute requiring
the abortionist to select the abortion technique which maximizes the chance of fetal
survival on the grounds that the statute did not clearly state that the pregnant woman's life or health must always prevail over that of the fetus).
186 See, e.g., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075-76 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (in defense of Roe Court's holding). Justice Powell, in his opinion
in Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1988) noted
that:
There are especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare decisis in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. T hat case was considered
with special care. It was first argued during the 1971 Term, and reargued-with extensive briefing-the following Term. The decision
was joined by The ChiefJustice and six other Justices. Since Roe . . .
the Court repeatedly and consistently has accepted and applied the
basic principles that a woman has a fundamental right to make the
highly personal choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
Id. at 420 n.1.
187 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2960-61 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment) (claiming that the Court overstepped its authority in insulating abortion decisions from state regulation); Ohio v.
Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990), (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (claiming that there is no constitutional right to abortion); Webster, 109
S. Ct. at 3064-67 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (calling
for an overruling of Roe); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("I
regretfully conclude that some of the concerns of the dissenting Justices in Roe, as
well as the concerns I expressed in my separate [concurring] opinion [in Roe] have
been realized."); id. at 833 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The 'undesired and uncomfortable straightjacket in this case ... is not the one the Court purports to discover
in Pennsylvania's statute; it is the one the [Roe] Court has tailored for the 50
States."); Akron, 462 U.S. at 459 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) ("[T]here is nojustification in law or logic for the trimester framework adopted in Roe ..
").
188 See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 15-10, at 1347 (1988) (footnote omitted) (margin by which Justices endorse principles of Roe v. Wade has decreased from original 7-2 to precarious 5-4). This observation was made without considering the
effect upon this thin majority, of the departures of Justices Powell and Brennan,
both of whom were supporters of Roe.
189 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). Webster involved a constitutional challenge to a Missouri statute which regulated the performance of abortions. Mo. Ann. Stat.
§§ 1.205, 188.010 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1990). The statute, in its preamble, provides that " '[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,' and that unborn
children have protectible interests in life ..
" Id. at 3047; (quoting Mo. Ann. Stat.
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§ l.205-(1)(l)-(2) (Vernon 1990)). The Statute requires that Missouri laws be interpreted to provide unborn children at every stage of development the same rights
enjoyed by other persons, subject only to the federal Constitution and Supreme
Court precedents. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3049 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205(2)
(Vernon 1990)). Section 188.029 of the statute requires that prior to performing
an abortion on a woman whom the attending physician has reason to believe carries
a fetus of 20 or more weeks gestational age, the physician must perform those medical procedures which he deems are necessary to ascertain whether the fetus is viable. Id. at 3054 (citing Mo. STAT. ANN. § 188.029 (Vernon 1983)).
In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Webster Court
determined that section 188.029 conflicted with the Court's holding in Roe, as well
as with subsequent abortion cases. See id. at 3054-56. The plurality recognized that
to the extent that section 188.029 controls the method for determining fetal viability, it "undoubtedly does superimpose state regulation on the medical determination of whether a particular fetus is viable." Id. at 3056 (citing Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 390-401 (1979)). Moreover, the Court conceded that the increased
costs of viability tests (in fact second-trimester abortions), may be deemed invalid.
Id. at 3056 (citing Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
434-35 (1983)). The plurality contended, however, that any doubt cast upon the
Missouri statute is in actuality reflective of the Roe Court's "rigid" and "unsound"
trimester scheme and not a result of a constitutional flaw in the statute itself. Id.
The Webster Court concluded that the required viability tests "permissibly further[ ]
the state's interest in protecting potential human life," thus demonstrating the constitutional validity of section 188.029 of the Missouri statute. The Webster Court
declined, however, to overrule Roe v. Wade. See generally id. at 3058. The plurality
determined that because the statute under review differed from that struck down in
Roe, the present case presented the Court with no occasion to review Roe v. Wade.
Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor reasoned that section 188.029
steered clear of any constitutional limitation required by Roe and subsequent cases.
Id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, the Justice noted, there was no
reason to re-examine the constitutional validity of Roe. Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). TheJustice concluded by stating that, "[w]hen the constitutional invalidity of a state's abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe
v. Wade, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe. And to do so carefully." Id. at
3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia, also concurring in the Court's judgment, held that the viability
testing mandated by the Missouri statute directly conflicted with the holding in Roe.
Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring). In contrast with the plurality, Justice Scalia advocated overruling Roe rather than merely limiting its application. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The Justice declined to set forth his reasons for perceiving Roe to be
bad law. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). This Justice did indicate, however, that abortion was essentially a political issue of which the Court had little business. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, held that the viability testing procedures not only conflicted with the Court's
holding in Roe but would not even pass constitutional muster under prior Court
precedents. See id. at 3070 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The Justice charged that the
statute required performance of all enumerated procedures even if all were not
necessary to determine fetal viability. Id. at 3069-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Thus, Justice Blackmun contended that the statute bore no rational relation to the
state's interest in protecting prenatal life. Id. at 3070. In addition, the Justice ar-
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ity and the value of pre-natal life in an abortion context' 9° would
suggest that Roe adherents no longer constitute a majority.'
The Court in Webster, as in other abortion cases, was asked to
rule on the facial validity of a statute for which no prosecution
had yet commenced. 192 Because no state court had construed
the statute there was considerable dispute between the litigants
as to its intended effect.' 9 3 At least some of the differences expressed in the Court's five separate opinions reflected divergent
constructions of the relevant statutory provisions rather than differences 'over the constitutionality of abortion regulations.' 94
The constitutional analysis was diverted away from a re-examinagued that the preamble could only be construed so as to have a chilling effect on
the performance of abortions. Id. at 3068 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun accused the plurality of misconstruing the statutory provisions relative to viability testing procedures in order to precipitate a conflict with
Roe. Id. at 3069-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justice criticized the plurality
for summarily rejecting the Roe Court's trimester framework without attempting to
analyze Roe's alleged flaws. Id. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further chastised the plurality for failing to address "the true jurisprudential
debate underlying [the] case: whether the Constitution includes an 'unenumerated'
general right to privacy [which] . . . extends to . . . abortion." Id. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Blackmun's analysis of the statute's preamble and the viability testing procedures. Id. at
3079-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, the Justice held that the preamble,
stating that life begins at conception, served no secular purpose and thus violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id. at 3082-85 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
190 The two cases subsequent to Webster, in which the Court ruled upon the constitutionality of abortion regulations, involved parental consent requirements
which arguably impeded a woman's ability to obtain an abortion. See Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2930-31 (1990) (discussed supra note 168 and accompanying text); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972,
2977 (1990) (discussed supra note 168 and accompanying text). Since the statutes
challenged in those cases were enacted to advance an interest of the pregnant woman's parents, rather than that of the fetus, the cases presented no opportunity to
reevaluate the state's interest in protecting prenatal life.
191 See supra note 189.
192 The statute did become effective until after the case had been filed. Compare
Mo. Ann. Star. § 1.205(2) (Vernon 1990) (effective January 1, 1988) with Webster,
109 S. Ct. at 3047 (suit filed inJuly 1986). The district court enjoined enforcement
pending the Supreme Court's ruling. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3048.
It is quite frequent for abortion litigation to involve facial challenges seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief, rather than reversal of a conviction. See, e.g.,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
752 (1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 425-26
(1983); Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 478 (1983);
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
193 See, e.g., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3049-50, 3053, 3054; id. at 3059, 3061
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
194 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067-71 n.l (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dis-

386

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

tion of the principles of Roe v. Wade in order to address issues
relevant to statutory construction and other issues which were
only peripheral to the central holding of Roe.' 95 Accordingly,
Webster, like other abortion cases, provided a poor vehicle
through which to re-examine Roe. The plurality's opinion, calling into question the validity of the trimester scheme without expressly overruling Roe, leaves the state of the law of abortion
muddled. Several of the Court's members have observed that
the trimester scheme is essential to the vitality of Roe. 196 Justice
Blackmun predicted that states will enact progressively more in197
trusive statutes which will test further the vulnerability of Roe.
Preliminary indications suggest Justice Blackmun is indeed correct. 9 8 The unfortunate consequences of this will be that state
legislators will focus on how far the Court will permit them to go
rather than what is the best law. 199 Recognition of these difficulties lead to only one conclusion-reargue Roe v. Wade.
Mark J. BeUtler
senting in part); id. at 3079, 3084-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
195 See generally Transcript,supra note 172, at B 12-14. Oral argument centered on
issues peculiar to the Missouri statute to the exclusion of matters central to the
holding in Roe.
196 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment); id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
197 Id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
198 See Lewin, States Testing the Limits on Abortion, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1990, at Al.
199 Some of the more recent legislative efforts to regulate abortion have included
provisions that allegedly would yield anomalous, even perverse, results. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2929, 2930-31 (1990) (invalidating statute which prohibited abortions for women under age 15 absent notification to both parents
including noncustodial divorced parent); Ciolli, It's No to Abortion Bill; Louisiana Veto
Cites Lack of Safeguardto Rape Victims, Newsday, July 28, 1990 (criticizing vetoed Louisiana abortion statute which allowed women, whose pregnancies resulted from
rape, to obtain an abortion only within seven days of the crime); Idaho's Laws and
Rapist's Rights, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1990, at, A16, Col. 1. (critic of vetoed Idaho
abortion statute alleged that statute granted rapists the right to obtain a court order
enjoining the victim's abortion).

